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Works co-authored with Jesse Fried

Paying for Long-Term Performance
Jesse Fried and Lucian Bebchuk
158 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1915-1960 (2010).
Harvard Law School Olin Discussion Paper No. 658, December 2009.

Pay without Performance: Overview of the Issues
Jesse Fried and Lucian Bebchuk
30 Journal of Corporation Law 647-673 (2005)
17 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 8-22 (2005)
February Academy of Management Perspectives 5-24 (2006).
[Reprinted in The History of Modern U.S. Corporate Governance (Brian R. Cheffins, ed., 2011).]
[Reprinted in Foundations of Corporate Law, 2nd ed., (Romano, ed., 2010).]
[Reprinted (translated into Mandarin) in 13 Tsinghua Commercial Law Review 2: 119-225 (2007), PDF file].

Comments on the proposed rules concerning the disclosure of executive compensation
Jesse Fried, Robert Jackson Jr. and Lucian Bebchuk
Article in SEC Today about the Filed Comments

Executive Compensation at Fannie Mae: A Case Study of Perverse Incentives, Nonperformance Pay, and Camouflage
Jesse Fried and Lucian Bebchuk
30 Journal of Corporation Law 807-822 (2005).
Article about the study in Washington Post, and SEC Today
Study noted in Washington Post, May 10, 2005, and Boston Globe.

Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation
Jesse Fried and Lucian Bebchuk
Harvard University Press, Nov. 2004.

Stealth Compensation via Retirement Benefits
Jesse Fried and Lucian Bebchuk
1 Berkeley Business Law Journal 291-326 (2004)
Study noted in Business Week, September 24, 2004.

Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem
Jesse Fried and Lucian Bebchuk
17 Journal of Economic Perspectives 71-92 (2003).
[Reprinted in The Economic Nature of the Firm: A Reader, 3rd ed., (Putterman and Kroszner, eds., 2009)]
[Reprinted in Hebrew Translation in A\4 Taagidim Law Review (2004) 3]
PDF file

Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation
Jesse Fried, David Walker and Lucian Bebchuk
[Selected as one of the year's top 10 corporate and securities articles, in the annual poll of the Corporate Practice Commentator.]
69 University of Chicago Law Review 751-846 (2002).
Earlier circulated as "Executive Compensation in America: Optimal Contracting or Extraction of Rents?"
Articles about the study The New York Times (Paul Krugman's column), Economist, Financial Times, Washington Post, Washingtom Post II (Robert Samuelson), US News and World Report.
Critique in The Wall Street Journal.

Executive Compensation in America: Optimal Contracting or Extraction of Rents?
Jesse Fried, David Walker and Lucian Bebchuk
Harvard Olin Discussion Paper No. 366
Revised as "Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation,"
69 University of Chicago Law Review 751-846 (2002).

A New Approach To Valuing Secured Claims In Bankruptcy
Jesse Fried and Lucian Bebchuk
114 Harvard Law Review 2386-2436 (2001).

 

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