Works co-authored with David Walker
Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive
Compensation
David Walker, Jesse Fried and Lucian Bebchuk
69 University of Chicago Law Review 751-846 (2002).
Earlier circulated as "Executive Compensation in
America: Optimal Contracting or Extraction of
Rents?"
[Selected as one of the year's top 10 corporate and securities articles in the annual poll of corporate law professors and reprinted in the Corporate Practice Commentator.]
Articles about the study The New York Times (Paul
Krugman's column), Economist, Financial Times, Washington Post, Washingtom Post II (Robert
Samuelson), US News and World Report.
Critique in The Wall Street
Journal.
Executive
Compensation in America: Optimal Contracting or Extraction of Rents?
David Walker, Jesse Fried and Lucian Bebchuk
Harvard Olin Discussion Paper No. 366
Revised as "Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive
Compensation" (2002).
The Overlooked Corporate Finance
Problems of a Microsoft
Breakup
David Walker and Lucian Bebchuk
56 The Business Lawyer 459-481
(2001).
[Translated into Spanish and published in 11 Advocatus 9-28 (2004 - II)]
You can also visit the website of my book:
Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation
(with Jesse Fried)
Harvard University Press
