Paper Abstract
308. Nuno Garoupa and Fernando Gomez-Pomar, Punish Once or Punish Twice: A Theory of the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Addition to Regulatory Penalties, 12/2000; subsequently published in American Law and Economics Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, Fall 2004, 410-433.
Abstract: Though clearly distinct in nature and procedure, both Regulatory Agencies and Courts frequently rely on similar instruments to sanction the same or very similar kinds of illegal behavior. In this paper, we develop a theory of the use of criminal sanctions in addition to regulatory penalties. We show that it is generally more effective to have a penalty imposed by a Regulatory Agency rather than by the Courts. We extend our analysis by considering imprisonment sentences, legal error, and collusion between a Regulatory Agency and an offender. The objective of the paper, though, is not limited to the determination of the theoretical conditions that can make the use of both sanctioning schemes optimal. Our analysis is also relevant to the application of a specific legal doctrine, the Double Jeopardy clause.